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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
PlaintiffIAppellant, Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho (CBEI) has appealed from the 
District Court's Memorandum Decision affirming the decision of the Magistrate Court in 
denying the PlaintiffIAppellant's Motion to Contest Exemption and granting the Defendant's 
Claim of Exemption. The PlaintiffIAppellant is appealing the District Court's decision as to 
whether PlaintiffIAppellant has standing to constitutionally challenge an exemption statute 
(Idaho Code § 11-204) and whether a constitutional right of PlaintiffIAppellant has been 
violated, together with the issue of the denial of PlaintiffIAppellant's request for attorney's fees. 
As a backdrop to the central issues identified above, are the issues of the operation of the 
community property system, as found in Idaho statutes, and the interplay of that community 
property system with creditor-debtor rights in the State of Idaho. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The beginnings of the instant case was the filing of a Colnplaiilt by CBEI, the instant 
PlaintiffIAppellant, in the Magistrate Division of the District Court of Madison County. The 
Complaint was filed on February 14, 2006. R. pp. 7-9. The Complaint generally alleged that 
moneys were due and owing by the Defendants, Jeff D. Lecheminant and Lisa Lecheminant in 
the sum of $391.16. The Complaint alleged that the Defendants were "husband and wife, who 
incurred the debts, as alleged herein, for community purposes." R. p. 8, p. 4 
The Magistrate Court entered default in favor of the CBEI on March 26, 2006, in the sum 
of$833.16. R. pp. 11-12. 
Thereafter, CBEI attempted collection of the Judgment by means of a Continuing 
Garnishment. See, e.g., R. pp. 14-18. 
The Magistrate Court, per Judge Mark Rammell, rescinded his Order for Continuing 
Garnishment and instructed CBEI that a continuing garnishment order would not be entered by 
the Magistrate Court. See, e.g., R. p. 47. 
Thereafter, CBEI served a Writ of Execution and a Notice of Garnishment on Eastern 
Idaho Regional Medical Center to garnish the wages of Sandy Moulton, the current wife of Jeff 
D. Lecheminant. The garnishment was served on or about September 26,2007. R. p. 48. 
A Claim of Exemption was asserted by EIRMC for itself and on behalf of Sandy 
Moulton, stating that an exemption was being claimed pursuant to Idaho Code 5 11-204. R. p. 
25. 
CBEI filed a Motion to Contest Claim of Exemption on October 17,2007. R. pp. 21-23. 
The Magistrate Court held a hearing on the Motion to Contest the Claim of Exemption 
and upon the claim of exemption. Said hearing was conducted on October 23,2007. Thereafter, 
the Magistrate Court entered an Order denying the Motion to Contest the Claim of Exemption 
and Granting the Claim of Exemption. R. pp. 53-54. 
CBEI filed its Notice of Appeal (from the Magistrate Court) with the District Court on 
February 28,2008. R. pp. 56-59. 
The District Court issued an Order Govelili~lg Procedure on Appeal (R. pp. 60-62). The 
District Court conducted a hearing and issued an opinion on February 11,2009. R. pp. 100-103. 
The PlaintiffIAppellant, CBEI filed a Notice of Appeal on March 12, 2009. R. pp. 105- 
STATEMENTS OF FACTS 
The instant case was initiated by Complaint doclceted on February 14, 2006, wherein 
Credit Bureau of Eastern Idaho, Inc. (CBEI) sued Jeff D. Lecheminant and Lisa Lecheminant for 
the stun of $391.16. R. pp. 7-9. In the Complaint, CBEI alleged that Jeff D. Lecheminant and 
Lisa Lecheminant were "husband and wife, who incurred the debts . . . for community purposes." 
R. p. 8. A default judgment was entered in favor CBEI on March 28, 2006 in the sum of 
$833.16. R. pp. 11-12. 
Subsequent to the default judgment, the Lecheminants divorced and thereafter Jeff 
Lecheminant married Sandy Moulton, who was and is employed by Eastern Idaho Regional 
Medical Center (EIRh4C). CBEI first attempted to obtain an Order of Continuing Garnishment. 
R. pp. 14-18. 
The Magistrate Court, per Judge Rammell, rescinded the Order of Continuing 
Garnishment and advised the CBEI that orders of continuing gamislunent would not be issued by 
the Magistrate Court. See R. p. 18 and R. p. 47. 
CBEI then resorted to a Writ of Execution, listing the Defendants as Jeff D. Lecheminant 
and Lisa Lecheminant, with a Notice of Garnislunent to EIRMC. R. pp. 51, 52. As stated, the 
Notice of Garnishment was directed to the employer of Sandy Moulton, EIRMC, a general acute 
care hospital located in Idallo Falls, Idaho. Sandy claimed an exemption, pursuant to Idaho Code 
5 11-204. R. pp. 25-26. A Claim of Exelnption was doclteted on October 15, 2007 by EIRMC 
and by Sandy Moulton. Upon the hearing of the Claim of Exemption, the Magistrate Court 
upheld the exemption contained in Idaho Code 5 11-204. R. pp. 53-54. CBEI appealed the 
Magistrate's decision to the District Court. After hearing and considering the arguments, the 
District Court entered its Memorandum Decision, which was docketed on February 11, 2009. 
The Memorandum Decision of the District Court upheld the decision of the Magistrate Court. R. 
pp. 100-104. Thereafter, CBEI filed its Notice of Appeal on March 12,2009. R. pp. 105-108. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. CBEI does not have standing to assert that Idaho Code 5 11-204 is 
unconstitutional. 
2. Idaho Code 3 11-204 is a valid constitutional statute that has never been repealed. 
3. I.C. 3 32-912 does not allow the garnishment in this case. 
4. The debt was not incurred for the benefit of "this" community. 
5. The principle of extension protects the wages of Sandy Moulton. 
6. Sandy Moulton's wages are not subject to garnishment per the Idaho Supreme 
Court's holding in Miller v. Miller, 1 13 Idaho 41 5 (1 987). 
7. The case of Action Collection Services, Inc, is not controlling in the instant case. 
8. The PlaintiffIAppellant is not entitled to attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
A. CBEI DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT THAT IDAHO CODE 5 11- 
204 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
111 the usual course, this Court has set out the procedure for a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statute based on an equal protection argument. This Court has stated as 
follows: 
"In addressing equal protection violations, the Court must first identify the 
classification being challenged and, second, it must determine the constitutional 
standard of review. Id. The Statute will only be found to deny equal protection 
under the rational basis test iE (1) the classification is totally unrelated to the 
state's goals, and (2) there is no conceivable state of facts that will support the 
state's classification." Venter v. Sorrento Delaware, Inc., 14 1 Idaho 245, 251, 
108 P.3d 392, 398 (Idaho 2005); See also, Are1 v. T&L Enterprises, Inc., 146 
Idaho 29, 189 P.3d 1149 (Idaho 2008). 
In the District Court, the District Court Judge identified two problems that CBEI had with 
its,chailenge to the constitutionality of Idaho Code $ 11-204. Those two problem areas are: (I) 
CBEI does not fit into the classification of those excluded from the benefits of Idaho Code 5 11- 
204 
violated by the statute. 
As to classification, it cannot be argued that CBEI is a married man, attempting to protect 
his separate property and the "special" classification of community property established in Idaho 
Code 5 11-204 ("The rents, issues and profits of separate property and compellsation due and 
owing for his personal services) from execution against his wife. The District Court, though not 
fully articulating the argument, recognized by his ruling that CBEI did not fit into this 
classification. 
The second problem area for CBEI recognized by the Court is the violation of some 
constitutionally protected right. Rights that have been enumerated in the Constitution (e.g., free 
speech, free exercise of religion, right to counsel, etc.) have been held to be protected from 
government interference. In addition to the rights enumerated in the Federal and State 
Constitutions, other rights have been found to be protected under the umbrella of equal 
protection. Some of those rights that have been found to be protected are: The right to travel, the 
right to privacy, wluch encompasses the right to many, the right to educate children, right to 
abortion, and the right to procreation. Other rights that have "won" protection are the right to 
vote, the rights of the mentally ill, freedom of association, housing, and contraception. See, e.g., 
Tarbox v. Tax Coinnzission, 107 Idaho 957,695 P.2d 342 (1985). 
In the instant case, there has been no delineation or recognized reservation of a 
constitutional riglit or of a statutory right of a creditor to execute against certain property that has 
the protection of an exemption created by legislative fiat. 
As the Appellant correctly points out, this Court has recognized standing when a party 
has a "personal stake" in the outcome of the litigation. This exception to being part of the class 
for challenge purposes is found when the party requesting recognition of standing suffers a 
"distinct, palpable injury and there is a fairly traceable causal connection between the claimed 
injury and the challenged conduct." See, e.g., Miles v. Idaho Power Conzpny, 116 Idaho 635, 
778 P.2d 757 (Idaho 1989). For purposes of this case, this Court must determine that CBEI has a 
personal stake in the outcome of this litigation and that the distinct injury that it suffers from has 
a causal connection between the claimed injury and the challenged conduct. This means this 
Court must conclude that the inability of CBEI to execute against the colnrnunity property of a 
non-party, non-debtor married woman is a distinct palpable injury and which is specific to CBEI 
(as opposed to the general population) and that this injury is the result of the operation of LC. 5 
For reasons stated elsewhere in this Brief, it is the contention of the Respondent that 
CBEI does not have the specific right to execute; but in the alternative that the doctrine of 
extension ought to be employed in the instant case, with the benefit of the legislation in question 
being extended to the excluded class -married men. This argument should end the discussion of 
injury and causal connection to the injury. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Respondent would urge this Courl to conclude that the 
Appellant has not met the classification requirements for standing and has not met tlie 
"exceptional case" exception for standing in tile instant case. 
B. IDAHO CODE § 11-204 IS A VALID CONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE THAT HAS 
NEVER BEEN REPEALED. 
In order to place the remainder of this section in context, it is necessary to con~plete a 
short review of community property tenants and principles. 
To begin with, there is no doubt that wages earned from the parties during marriage are 
community property. Idaho Code ij 32-906(1) states: 
All other property acquired after marriage by either husband or wife is com~nunity 
propel-ty. The iiiconie of all property separate or community, is cominunity 
property unless the conveyance by which it is acquired provides or both spouses, 
by written agreement specifically so providing, declare that all or specifically 
designated property and the income from all or the specifically designated 
property shall be the separate property of one of the spouses of the income from 
all or specifically designated separate property be the separate property of the 
spouse to whom the property belongs. Such property shall be subject to the 
management of the spouse owning the property and shall not be liable for the 
debts of the other member of the community. 
Idaho statutes are also clear that the separate property of either spouse is not liable for the 
debts of the other spouse that were contracted or incurred before marriage. Unfortunately, as 
many commentators have stated, these statutes only provide what property is not liable and do 
not state what property is liable. There is no express statutory statement as to whether 
community property is liable for antenuptial debts. See, e.g., Idaho Code 5 32-910 (separate 
property of husband not liable for debts of wife contracted before marriage) and Idaho Code 5 
32-91 1 (separate property of the wife is not liable for debts of her husband, but is liable for her 
own debts contracted before or affer marriage). 
Idaho Code § 11-204 states: 
All real and personal estate belonging to any married woman at the time of her 
marriage, or to which she subsequently becomes entitled in her own right, and all 
the rents, issues and profits thereof, and all compensation due or owing for her 
personal services, is exempt from execution against her husband. 
This statute creates a special kind of community property. Professor of law, W.J. 
Brockelbank, noted in his 1962 book, The Community Property Law of Idaho at pp.265-66 as 
follows: 
The Idaho legislature of 1881 set up a special kind of community property, viz., 
"rents, issues and profits" of the wife's separate property and "all compensation 
due or owing for her personal services" (both of wliich are conm~unity property in 
Idaho) and provided that this special kind of community property should be 
"exempt from execution against her husband." (See fnl on page 21 of this brief) 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in McMillan v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 48 Idaho 163,270 
P.220 held: 
As to the earnings of a maried woman, not living separate and apart konl her 
husband, on account of her personal services, the exemption applies only to 
such earnings as are due and owing. After the earnings have been paid, or 
converted into other property, the exemption granted by said section no 
longer obtains. 
Id. at 280 P. 222 (emphasis added). 
Now for the devilment. This Coui?, in Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170, 898 P.2d 1081 
(1995) stated in dicta as follows: "Parties often marry with separate ante-nuptial debts, and those 
debts are payable from community property." The court cited to two ancient cases, Holt v. 
Empey and Gustin v. Byam. This mischief was then talcen up by the appeals court in the case of 
Action Collection Service, Inc. v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753, 69 P.3d 173 (Ct. App. 2003). The sad 
part of this commentary is that the Court of Appeals understood exactly what they were doing 
and what the Bliss case actually was precedent for, given the issues in that case. In the Action 
case, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Both Holt and Gustin were decided at a tiine when the husband was given sole 
power to manage and control the community property by statute. In 1974, the 
legislature amended LC. 9 32-912, giving the husband and wife equal 
management and control of the community property. See 1974 Idaho Session 
Laws, Ch. 194 Section 2. Despite the change in tile management and control of 
the colnmunity property, and in spite of any doubt concerning the continued 
vitality of Holt and Gustin, those cases were cited with approval by our Supreme 
Court in Bliss v. Bliss, 127 Idaho 170,898 P.2d 1081 (1995). 
In that case, the court recognized that parties often marry with separate 
antenuptial debts. Citing Holt and Gustin, the court observed in dicta that the 
separate antenuptial debts of a husband or wife are payable from cominunitv 
property. 
Although the court in Bliss was not presented with the situation facing us in this 
case, where a judgment creditor is attempting to garnish one spouse's community 
property wages to satisfy that spouse's separate antenuptial debt, the court's 
holding was not limited to the facts of that case and we perceive no reason to do 
so. To prevent Action from levying against Seele's wages to collect on its -
judgment and to allow Seele to avoid her responsibility for the debts encompassed 
by Action's judgment would result in marital bankruptcy, particularly if Seele has 
insufficient separate property to justify the judgment. Hence, although Seele 
argues to the contrary, she remains responsible for the unpaid debts constituting 
Action's judgment and her community property wages should not be placed 
beyond Action's reach to satisfy its judgment. Id. at 138 Idaho 753, 178. 
(emphasis supplied) 
Therefore, dicta which did not apply to the controverted issues in the original cited case, 
is expanded by the Court of Appeals into a rule of law that is now supposed to govern the instant 
action, even though in Seele the spouse (Seele) was a member of the original marital community 
as opposed to the situation in the instant case, where Sandy Moulton is not the original 
contracting or judgment debtor spouse. 
If one wishes to stretch precedent beyond the bounds of the original case, a better 
reference would be to the case of Twin Falls Bank &Trust Co. v. Joan F. Holley, 11 1 Idaho 349, 
723 P.2d 893 (Idaho 1986). In that case, this Court ruled that: 
Generally speaking, a creditor must obtain a judgment to collect on a debt, 
whether it is based on contract, tort or other obligations. The exception would be 
if the obligation were secured by a mortgage or some other form of security 
interest. Once a creditor obtains a judgment, he is able to obtain on his debt by 
execution on the debtor's assets. "These judicial procedures do not change 
whether dealing with a single or married debtor. The difference is the type of 
property that is subject to execution or attachment for the debt involved." 
(Citation omitted). Under the facts of this case, a debtor-creditor relationship 
existed only between the bank and respondent's ex-husband, John Holley. The 
debt evidenced by the June 26, 1981 promissory note was incurred by John 
Holley for the benefit of the marital community. However, respondent Joan 
Holley, not having signed the note, was not contractually liable for the debt 
evidenced by the promissory note; only John Holley signed and is liable for the 
note. . . .The phrase "comnunity debt" is correct terminology insofar as it is used 
to signify a debt incurred for the benefit of the marital community. However, to 
the extent the phrase is used to imply the existence of a "community debtor," the 
phrase is in-precise and misleading. The marital community is not a legal entity, 
such as a business partnership or corporation. (Citations omitted). While one may 
properly speak of a "corporate debtor," tliere is no such entity as a community 
debtor. See, Williams v. Paxton, 98 Idaho 155, 559 P.2d 1123 (1977); (Citations 
omitted). To the extent a lending institution enters into a creditor-debtor 
relationship with either member of the marital community or with both members, 
it does so on a purely individual basis. Thus, the lending institution may have a 
creditor-debtor relationship with either spouse separately or with both jointly. As 
stated earlier, the commuliity property systeln does not  affect the fundamental 
principles governing such a relationship and the procedures required of a creditor 
in order to collect upon his debt. Rather, the coill~lluliity property systeln merely 
affects the type or kinds of property which the creditor may look for satisfaction 
of his unpaid debt. . . . 
The debt upon which the bank is asserting this claim against Mrs. Holley was 
evidenced by the promissory note executed solely by Mr. Holley on June 26, 
1981, which had renewed an earlier note. At the time the bank had a claim 
against Mr. Holley, which it could satisfy by judgment mid executioil against 
either Mr. Holley and any separate property which have had, or against the 
community property of Mr. and Mrs. Holley. Id at 11 l Idaho 349, 352 - 353. 
(emphasis supplied) 
By analogy, Sandy Moulton in this case was not a party to the obligation that was 
incurred that gave rise to the initial complaint in this matter. Ms. Moulton also was not a 
member of the marital community to which the obligation attached, as alleged in the initial 
complaint. As in the Twin fills case, in the instant case there was no connection between Ms. 
Moulton and the underlying obligation or the judgment that was obtained evidencing the 
underlying obligation. 
Assuming arguendo the absence of Idaho Code § 11-204, Idaho recognizes not only the 
equal management and control of the community property by either spouse (Idaho Code § 32- 
912); it also recognizes that each spouse has an undivided one-half interest in all community 
property. See, e.g., Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102, 741 P.2d 1289 (Idaho 1986); Mason v. 
Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 59 P.2d 1087 (Idaho 1936). To extend the logic of the Twin Falls case, Ms. 
Moulton, though she had equal management and control of the present community property, she 
did not have any management or control of the previous marital community of Lecheminants. 
Ms. Moulton was a complete stranger to the judgment obtained by CBEI and there is no 
evidence that there was any disclosure of said judgment by Mr. Lecheminant to Ms. Moulton of 
the judgment. To allow the execution and garnishment of Ms. Moulton's interest in the 
community property she earned by her labor is to imply that upon her marriage to Mr. 
Lecheminant she consented to all of his ante-nuptial debts and that her share of t l~e  community 
property could be executed upon - the equivalent of implied or constructive consent. This 
conclusion flies in the face of what should be sound public policy. In the teachings or  the Twin 
Falls case, it was noted that creditors should follow the usual procedures for collections of their 
debiq, i.e. judgment and judgment debtor. The Twin Falls case also points out what should be 
inherent in this case; that the creditor should seek to satisfy the debt from the property of the 
debtor spouse and from the property of Lisa Lecheminant. In this case, there has been no 
showing that the creditor first attempted to satisfy the debt from the separate property of the 
judgment debtors (Jeff Lecheminant and Lisa Lecheminant) or from non-exempt community 
property of the judgment debtors. Under the teachings of the Tiviiz Falls case cited supra, the 
debt ought to follow the property of the judgment debtors. Likewise, there have been no 
allegations of any fraudulent transfers of property by Mr. Lecheminant or by Lisa Lecheminant 
to prevent recovery for CBEI. 
In this case, the judgment creditor is seeking a windfall upon the formation of a new 
marital community. As stated, the separate property of the judgment debtors and the non-exempt 
commuility property of the new colnmunity is still available to the judgment creditor for 
satisfaction of this debt. This exact situation is why the exemption was created (no knowledge, 
no control and no management). The logic is reinforced if this Court, by the doctrine of 
extension, provides the same cove of protection to married men. 
C. I.C. § 32-912 DOES NOT ALLOW THE GARNISHMENT IN THIS CASE. 
Appellant has asserted that pursuant to I.C. 5 32-912 the antenuptial debts of one spouse 
binds the colnmunity property and thus makes the community assets available for execution. 
This section states that "Either the husband or the wife shall have the right to manage and colltrol 
the community property and either may bind the community by contract . . ." The Appellant's 
argument is misplaced since the debt and judgment arose prior to the inception and existence of 
the present community (with Ms. Moulton). The debts at issue in this case were not incurred 
during the existence of this community. The non-debtor spouse (Sandy Moulton) was not a party 
to the collection action against her husband and yet the Appellant has attempted to execute on the 
non-party, non-debtor's spouse's interest in the present conmunity property in violation of her 
due process rights. Sandy Moulton did not have any notice of this debt and did not have any 
opportunity to contest its validity. The only procedural safeguard was the exemption supplied by 
I.C. 5 11-204 and the attendant exemption hearing. But for the exemption hearing, her property 
interests would have been unilaterally taken. Her property would have been talcen without CBEI 
posting a bond, without an application to a judge (the garnishment is signed by the County 
Sheriff) (the Writ of Execution only refers to the defendants, not to Sandy Moulton) and no 
showing of probable cause (to prevail). The dicta of Bliss now reveals itself in real life and 
extended to maturity in the hands of a zealous collector. 
D. THE DEBT WAS NOT INCURRED FOR THE BENEFIT OF "THIS" 
COMMUNITY. 
Since the Appellant in this case attempted to garnish Ms. Moulton's wages, which are 
exempt community per I.C. § 11-204, the question then becomes whether or not a judgment 
creditor can attach the exempt community property of Ms. Moulton to satisfy the antenuptial 
debt of Ms. Moulton's present husband where she was neither a party nor judgment debtor to or 
in the original case or in the original debtor marital community. Courts in Idaho have held that if 
the debt was incurred for the benefit of the community then the debt can be paid from the 
community property. The debt which gave rise to this action arose before the present marital 
community of Ms. Moulton and Mr. Lecheminant was formed and was not incurred for the 
benefit of the community of Ms. Moulton and Mr. Lecheminant. The present community, 
therefore, is not obligated to repay such debts from this particular community property (wages), 
which is the exempt community property of Ms. Moulton under I.C. 5 11-204. 
The United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (applying Idaho law) in a matter 
regarding a foreclosure action stated, "Only if the debt is incurred for the benefit of the 
community does I.C. 5 32-912 allow satisfaction of the unpaid debt from the community 
property." First Idaho Couporation v. Davis, 867 F.2d 1241, 1243 (9"' Cir. 1989). In Freeburn 
v. Fueeburn, 97 Idaho 845, 849, 555 P.2d 385, 389 (1976) the Court held "The character of an 
item of property as com~nunity or separate vests at the time of its acquisition." (Citations 
omitted). This is the logic that must be followed here, that the debt acquired by Mr. 
Lecheminant is separate in character since it was vested prior to the formatioli of the new 
community; or the debt is a community debt of a former community that cannot be satisfied out 
of the "present" special kind of comlnunity property created by LC. Fj 11-204. 
E. THE PNNCIPLE OF EXTENSION PROTECTS THE WAGES OF SANDY 
MOULTON. 
Upon reviewing Idaho case law, none have addressed the specific question as to whether 
or not the special kind of conlmunity property created by LC. § 11-204, including wages, can be 
attached by a judgment creditor to satisfy an antenuptial debt of the debtor spouse. However, 
there is case law indicating that community property classified under I.C. § 11-204 cannot be 
used for that purpose. The subject debt was not incurred for the benefit of this present 
community, the debt was not acquired during the existence of this present conmlunity, and its 
very nature is separate in character in regard to the present community. 
Further, "[a] party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of 
proving the statute is unconstitutional and must overcome a strong presumption of validity." In 
Re: Karel, 144 Idaho 379, 162 P.3d 758,762 (2007). 
Idaho Code § 11-204 (the main portion in existence since 1864) has never been totally 
stricken by the Idaho Legislature or overturned by this Court. By symmetry of reasoning it must 
be assumed that I.C. 3 11-204 applies equally to married men as it does married woman. This 
principle of extension has been approved in Idaho law. See e.g., Murphey v. Murphey, 103 Idaho 
720, 653 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1982); Neveau v. Neveau, 103 Idaho 707, 652 P.2d 655 (Ct. App. 
1982); Harrigfeld v. District Court, 95 Idaho 540, 511 P.2d 822 (1973). In the Murphey case, 
this Court, in addressing a similar situation (alimony statute in favor of women) stated: 
It is apparent that the legislature would have intended that the benefits of the 
alimony statute should be extended to the excluded class, rather than taken from 
the benefitted class, and we should therefore extend those benefits in order that 
the legislative will, albeit not giffed with omniscience, should be carried out. 
If an important congressional policy is to be perpetuated by recasting 
unconstitutional legislation, the analytically sound approach is to accept 
responsibility for [the] decision. Its justification cannot be by resort to legislative 
intent, as that term is loosely employed, but by a different kind of legislative 
intent, namely the presumed grant of power to the courts to decide whether it 
more nearly accords with congress' wishes to eliminate its policy altogether or 
extend it in order to render what congress plainly did intend, constitutional. 
Welch v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 355-56, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 1804, 26 L.Ed.2d 
308 (1970) (Harland, J., concurring). 
The court in Oru implicitly recognized that alimony statutes are to be considered 
as providing a benefit to the receiver of the alimony when it is stated that . . ., as 
the state could respond to a reversal by neutrally extending alimony rights to 
needy husbands as well as wives. (Citations omitted). 
On remand froin the Supreme Court, the Alabama Court of Appeals in fact 
responded to reversal by neutrally extending alimony rights to needy husbands as 
well as wives. (Citations omitted) Id at 103 Idaho 720,723-24. 
In Harvigfield cited above, this Court stated: 
A holding that a statutory classification scheme constitutes a denial of equal 
protection because it unconstitutionally grants a benefit to one class while 
denying it to another, does not necessarily mandate a denial of the benefit to both 
classes. Harrideld 11 District Court, 95 Idaho 540, 545, 511 P.2d 822, 827 
(1973). 
If one reviews tile legislative history and intents and purposes of the overall domestic 
relation scheme in Idaho, one can conclude that extension naturally should flow in and to the 
instant situation. As already observed in this brief, and as observed by the Appellant in its brief, 
the idea and outgrowth of the exemption is tied to the managemeilt and coiltrol of the marital 
community and that the exemption ought to be linked to the management and control of the 
marital community, or a portion of the marital community. From 1915 to 1974, by statute, a 
wife had the exclusive management and control of her earnings, not her husband. Therefore, 
there was a linkage between management and control and the exemption as found in Idaho Code 
5 11-204. In 1974, we had the advent of mutual ma~lagemeilt and control of the community by 
the marital partners (I.C. § 32-912). It is inherent in equal management and control that there is 
an implied consent by and between the marital partners that either partner can bind the lnarital 
community. In the instant case, Sandy Moulton did not have any knowledge of, let alone any 
implied consent as to the antenuptial debt that is present in this case. Given the implications of 
knowledge, consent, managemei~t, and control, should it be validly concluded that the benefits 
that are provided by Idaho Code 5 11-204 should be terminated to married women in a 
subsequent marital comn~unity who now benefit by the statute? It is our argument that the 
benefit should not be terminated. The clear legislative purpose was to link knowledge, consent, 
inanage~neiit and control to this "special kind of colmnunity property." It was to provide a 
married woman with some protection from debts that she had no control over or had no input in 
regard to the creation of said debt. The statute is to provide help to the spouse without 
knowledge or control over the debt and preserve the economic status of the marriage, pending 
further developments. The purposes of the statute would be thwarted by an invalidation of Idaho 
Code 5 11-204. However, by extending the statute's benefit to married men in the same 
situation, the legislative purposes of Idaho Code 5 11-204 would be effectuated. See, e.g., Peters 
v. Narick, 270 S.E.2d 760,767 (W.Va. 1980). 
The policy of an exemption also argues for the application of the extension doctrine. 
The underlying policy of an exemption is that a person should be entitled to some minimum 
amount of property and income to maintain a subsistence level to lessen the risk of that person 
becoming a ward of the state. The recognition of how important wages and earnings are to the 
financial viability of a person is found in the Federal Wage Garnishment Law, Consumer 
Protection Credit Acts, Title I11 (CCPA) (See, also, Idaho Code 5 28-45-104 (Limitation on 
Garnishment)). 
It is the position of the instant author that havoc would result from the voiding of Idaho 
Code 5 11-204 in respect to earnings, inasmuch as the voiding would impose as much a hardship 
on husbands similarly situated as with wives. Why would this Court wish to impose economic 
and social hardship upon any class, when it would appear that with the passage of the 1974 equal 
management and control of community property, that the legislature intended to extend the 
benefits to husbands as well as to wives in the situation posed by the instant case. 
The exemption provided by I.C. 5 11-204 is to be construed liberally in favor of the 
debtor. See e.g., In Re Moore, 269 BR 864 (BR D. Idaho 2001). In this case the exemption 
should be construed even more liberally in favor of Ms. Moulton and be extended to married 
men. For Ms Moulton, because she is not the debtor, or a party to this suit, and was not even 
married to Jeff Leche~~linant when the debt was incurred. For married men because many will 
find themselves in the same situation as Ms. Moulton without any procedural safeguard but for 
the exemption. If Appellant's argument is accepted and Ms. Moulton is not granted the 
exemption given to her per LC. § 11-204, married womei-i and men will effectively have no 
management and no control over their earnings when in a new marital community and will 
without any procedural safeguards as to the garnishment of their wages. 
F. SANDY MOULTON'S WAGES ARE NOT SUBJECT TO GARNISHMENT PER 
THE IDAHO SUPREME COURT'S HOLDING IN MILLER V.  MILLER, 113 
rmrro 41s (1987). 
In Miller v. Miller, 113 Idaho 415, 420, 745 P.2d 294, 299 (1987) this Court stated and 
held: 
After the entry of the district court's judgment for damages against E. Paul, Pete 
filed pursuant to I.C. 5 8-509 (Supp. 1987) a motion for colrtinuing garnishment 
against the wages of E. Paul's spouse, Paula Miller. Followi~lg a hearing, the 
court denied the motion on the ground of Pete's failure to name Paula as a party 
defendant. The district court reasoned that allowing a garnishment of Paula's 
wages without having been made a party defendant, and with the judgment having 
been entered only against her husband, would deny her due process of law. We 
agree with the district court's conclusion that the joinder of a spouse as a party 
defendant was a necessary prerequisite, under LC. 5 8-509(b) . . . 
The language of I.C. 5 8-509 is specifically limited to a "judgment creditor" and a 
"judgment debtor." "A well-settled rule of construction is that the words of a 
statute must be given their plain, usual and ordinary nleaning in the absence of 
any ambiguity." (Citations omitted). A judgment debtor according to Black's 
Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979), p. 758 is, "A person against whom judgment has 
been recovered, and which remains unsatisfied." Paula, having not been a named 
party defendant, clearly did not qualify as a judgment debtor and, hence, was not 
within the scope of LC. 5 8-509(b). 
The Miller case is closely analogous to the matter at hand. In this case, Sandy Moultou 
was not a party defendant and is not a "judgment debtor" just as Paula Miller in the Miller case. 
If this Court would not allow a continuing garnishment against someone who is not a "judgment 
debtor" then why would it allow a notice of garnishment against someone who is not a "judgment 
debtor" and a stranger to the debt? It is Moulton's and EIRMC's position that Miller stands for 
the proposition that garnishment of any type can only be effected against persons who are 
actually party defendants in a suit and are judgment debtors. Therefore, because Sandy Moulton 
was not a party defendant in this matter and no judgment was entered against her, the wages of 
Sandy Moulton cannot be garnished. 
In the District Court's opinion, citation is made to Idaho Code § 11-201. Based upon the 
Court's language in its citation to this statute, it is assumed by this author that the Court was 
referring to Idaho Code § 11-201 for its definition of what property was subject to seizure (all 
goods, chattels, moneys and other property, both real and personal, or any interest therein of the 
judgment debtor, not exempt by law, and all property and rights of property, seized and held 
under attachment in the action, are liable to execution) (emphasis supplied). What the District 
Court overlooked is the legislative history of Idaho Code 11-20 1. It was passed and enacted at 
the same time and in the same legislative act as Idaho Code 11-204. This means that both 
statutes would have to be viewed as a legislative whole. See e.g., St. Lukes Regional Medical 
Center v. Board oJCounty Conzinissioner ofAda County, 146 Idaho 753, 203 P.3d 683 (2009). 
The legislature completely understood that they had created a special type of property for women 
and that 11-201 cotzld not be used to seize that property, when 11-204 specifically shielded it 
from seizure. Therefore, given the legislative history and intent of what property is liable for 
seizure and what property is not liable to seizure, the special type of property shielded fiom 
seizure in $ 11-204 would not be subject to garnishment in this action, either by operation of 
legislative construction or by the operation of the doctrine of extension.' 
6. THE CASE OF ACTION COLLECTION SERVICES, IINC., IS NOT 
CONTROLLING IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
The case of Action Collectioiz Services, Inc. v. Seele, 138 Idaho 753, 69 P.3d 173 (Ct. 
App. 2003) does not aid the court in its determination of the instant appeal. 
There are multiple factual and legal differences between the case at the bar and the 
Action Collection Services, Inc. case. Most of these issues have been addressed in previous 
sections; however, to recapitulate those differences, the court should consider the following: 
1. 111 Action Collection Services, Inc., Seele was the judgment debtor. 
2. Seele did not dispute that she was colltractually liable for the debts encompassed 
by the Action judgment. 
3. There is absolutely no discussion in the Action Collectioiz Services, Inc. case of 
the exemption granted by I.C. $1 1-204. 
1 The act that gave the Idaho Territory both present code sections 11-201 and 11-204 were actually passed in 
Idaho's f r s t  territorial session as Sections 220 and 221. See General Laws of Idaho, Title VII, $5  220 and 221, 
respectively (Dec. 1863 to Feb. 1864). This means the exemption in 5 11-204 predates col~ununity property in 
Idaho. h4y regrets to Professor Brockelba~~lc. 
4. In the instant case, Sandy Moulton is not the judgment debtor. 
5. Sandy Moulton is not liable for the underlying debts that encompass the judgment 
in the instant case. 
What the Appellant wants is a simple equation: the earnings in dispute are community 
property and community property is subject to garnishment. This is not true in all cases under all 
circumstances. The Miller case cited above indicates that the mechanism of obtaining 
garnishment is limited to judgment creditors and judgment debtors in certain circumstances. 
Sandy Moulton does not fit into the category of a judgment debtor, indeed, Sandy Moulton is in 
the same situation of the judgment debtor's new husband who was not named in the Action 
Collection Services, Inc. case. There is a reason for that: garnishment would not work in regard 
to an individual not responsible for the underlying debt and not named as a party (iudgment 
debtor) in the judgment. 
In summary, the Action Collection Services, Inc. case only serves to show the complete 
disconnect in the instant case between a judgment creditor and a party who is not responsible for 
the debt and is not susceptible to garnishment in as much as the individual is not a judgment 
debtor. 
N. THE PLAINTIFFIAPPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTTORNEY'S FEES. 
In approaching the question of attorney's fees, the Court is aware that Idaho follows 
what is commonly known as the American Rule, "that attorney's fees are to be awarded only 
where they are authorized by statute or contract." Hiller v. Cenarusa, 106 Idaho 571, 578, 682 
P.2d 525 (1984). The party asserting the claim for attorney's fees has the burden of directing the 
Court's attention to either a statute or a contract between the parties authorizing the award of 
attorney's fees. 
In the instant case, the PlaintifflAppellant places special emphasis upon Idaho Code 5 
12-120(5). Thc basis for the award of attorney's fees in the Coinplaint are identified as Idaho 
Code $ 5  12-120(1) and 12-120(3). 
A close reading of both subsectioll (1) and (3) of Idaho Code 5 12-120 reveals that 
attorney's fees cannot be awarded in this case, inasmuch as the person who filed the Claim of 
Exemption and has followed through with this case is Sandy Moulton and EIRMC, not one of 
the named defendants in the instant case. See R. p. 25. See R. p. 40. Neither Sandy Moulton or 
EIRMC received a demand letter in regard to the amounts claimed by the PlaintiffIAppellant, as 
required under Idaho Code 3 12-120(1). Indeed, neither sandy Moulton or EIRMC was a party 
to the action initiated by the filing of ihe Compiaint in tile instant matter. 
Likewise, neither Sandy Moulton or EIRMC was the object of the Plaintiffs in seeking to 
recover on a11 open acco~~llt, account stated, nore, bill, negotiable instrument, guarantee or 
contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods . . . . (I.C. 5 12-120(3)) 
Therefore, the underlying predicates for the triggering of Idaho Code 5 12-120(5) are not 
found in the instant case. 
In the instant case, you have two conlplete strangers to the judgment, Sandy Moulton and 
EIRMC, who filed the Claim of Exemption and thereafter opposed the collection of Sandy 
Moulton's community property from her e~nployer. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Respondents, Sandy Moulton and EIRMC, respectfully 
request that PlaintiffiAppellant's attorney fee request be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the analysis, case law precedent, and statutes set forth above, Sandy Moulton 
and EIRMC respectfully requests that this Court deny appellant's appeal in all respects. 
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